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When Statutory Interpretation
Becomes Precedent: Why Individual
Rights Advocates Shouldn’t Be So
Quick to Praise Bostock
Elena Schiefele
Abstract
Justice Neil Gorsuch’s approach to textualism, which this
Note will call “muscular textualism,” is unique. Most notably
exemplified in Bostock v. Clayton County, muscular textualism
is marked by its rigorous adherence to what Justice Gorsuch
perceives to be the “plain language” of the text. Because Justice
Gorsuch’s opinions exemplify muscular textualism in a
structured and consistent manner, his appointment to the
Supreme Court provides the forum from which he can influence
the decision-making process of other members of the judiciary
when they seek guidance from Supreme Court precedent.
Accordingly, it is important for both advocates and judges to
understand the muscular textualist analysis and its often
rights-restrictive results.
Muscular textualism departs from new textualism, the
interpretive approach Justice Scalia promoted, in several
respects. This Note focuses on two main differences between
muscular textualism and new textualism: muscular textualism’s
enhanced literalness, which causes the interpreter to adopt the
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most basic, narrow, and superficial interpretation of the text
rather than exploring the nuances of the phrase at issue, and
muscular textualism’s constrained view of what context
interpreters may consider to discover the proper meaning of the
text.
Part III of this Note applies the framework developed in
Part II to two interpretive questions that have created a circuit
split. First, it examines whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act prohibits restrictive voter ID laws. It then turns to Title III of
the Americans with Disabilities Act and asks whether plasma
centers are subject to compliance with Title III. Finally, this Note
concludes by pointing to the potential impact of muscular
textualism beyond the confines of statutory interpretation.
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1107
I.

NEW TEXTUALISM .......................................................... 1112

II.

JUSTICE GORSUCH’S INFLUENCE: THE MUSCULAR
TEXTUALISM FRAMEWORK............................................. 1114
A. Muscular Textualism’s Strong Inclination Toward
Literalness .............................................................. 1115
B. What Context Should Be Considered? ................... 1125
1. Social Context is Ignored .................................. 1125
2. Statutory Context Is Rarely Relevant .............. 1128
3. Statutory Structure Deserves Consideration .. 1130
4. Statutory History Is Significant ....................... 1132
C. More Context Can Be Considered for Ambiguous
Language ................................................................ 1134

III.

APPLYING MUSCULAR TEXTUALISM .............................. 1137
A. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Does Not Prohibit
Restrictive Voter ID Laws ...................................... 1138
1. Denial or Abridgement of the Right to Vote .... 1140
2. The Causation Standard ................................... 1144
3. The Meaning of “Race” ...................................... 1146
4. Statutory History .............................................. 1149
B. Title III of the ADA Applies to Plasma Centers ..... 1150

CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 1155

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

1107

INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in
Bostock v. Clayton County1 in June of 2020, the decision was
hailed as proof that textualism was ideologically neutral.2 The
opinion, authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, was a major victory
for LGBT rights.3 At the same time, it showed an unflinching
adherence to the statute’s text. Bostock demonstrates that
though Justice Gorsuch’s jurisprudence has been criticized for
being results-oriented,4 the statutory text sometimes leads him
to a different conclusion than one would expect of a
“conservative” justice.5 In other cases, Justice Gorsuch’s
statutory interpretation has been rights-restrictive.6 His
approach to textualism is unique. As this Note demonstrates,
the interpretive method in Bostock was neither an anomaly

1. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
2. See Cary Franklin, Living Textualism, 2021 SUP. CT. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2) (on file with author) (describing the
response to Bostock).
3. See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Delivers Major Victory to
LGBTQ Employees, NPR (June 15, 2020, 10:19 AM), https://perma.cc/2K9PPTYC (“The decision is a huge victory for the LGBTQ community . . . .”).
4. Between Justice Gorsuch’s nomination and confirmation to the
Supreme Court, Senator Chuck Schumer lamented, “This country can ill afford
another justice who will side with the powerful. Now, Judge Gorsuch may act
like a studied neutral judge, but his record suggests he actually has a
right-wing, pro-corporate special interest agenda.” U.S. Senate Session,
C-SPAN at 17:22 (Mar. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/FK2F-SLCS; see infra note
305 and accompanying text.
5. Commentators typically group Justice Gorsuch with the Supreme
Court’s conservative bloc. See, e.g., Robert Barnes & Seung Min Kim,
‘Everything Conservatives Hoped for and Liberals Feared’: Neil Gorsuch Makes
His Mark at the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2019, 5:50 PM),
https://perma.cc/M896-J2H5 (“[Justice Gorsuch] has established himself as
one of the [C]ourt’s most conservative justices . . . .”). However, Justice
Gorsuch himself rejects ideological labelling of judges. See Confirmation
Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Committee on
the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 70 (2017) (“[T]here is no such thing as a Republican
judge or a Democratic judge. We just have judges in this country.”). This Note
therefore uses the term “conservative” to refer to a justice typically associated
with the Court’s conservative bloc.
6. See, e.g., Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 608 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (interpreting the tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1367
narrowly to bar the suit).
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among Justice Gorsuch’s jurisprudence, nor does it mark a shift
toward rights-protective interpretation of statutes unarguably
passed with a rights-protective purpose.7 Instead, it illustrates
that Justice Gorsuch adheres to the text more rigorously and
more powerfully than his textualist colleagues. For that reason,
this Note calls his methodology “muscular textualism.”8
Muscular textualism repeatedly results in a crabbed,
formalistic, and narrow reading of the text that heightens the
evidentiary burden of a plaintiff who has been wronged.9 Even
in Bostock itself, the muscular textualist interpretation of the
statute was not as broad or protective as it first seemed.10
Because “the Supreme Court does not give stare decisis
effect to doctrines of statutory interpretation methodology,”
theories of statutory interpretation at the Supreme Court evolve
more quickly than non-methodological law.11 Only four years
after Justice Antonin Scalia’s appointment to the Supreme
Court, Professor William Eskridge observed that the Justice’s
critique of the Court’s use of legislative history had “already
changed the Court’s practice in statutory interpretation
cases.”12 More recently, advocates have begun to take note of
Justice Gorsuch’s unique approach to statutory interpretation
and are arguing cases accordingly.13
7. See infra Parts IIIII.
8. Justice Gorsuch’s interpretive methodology has also been called
“formalistic textualism.” See Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV.
L. REV. 265, 275 (2020) (differentiating between “formalistic textualism”
applied by Justice Gorsuch in the majority opinion in Bostock, and “flexible
textualism” applied by the dissents).
9. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140
S. Ct. 1009, 1014 (2020) (adopting a but-for causation test); Minority Business
Discrimination, LDF (2021), https://perma.cc/AS32-XB9A (“The decision will
make it more difficult to hold entities engaged in discrimination accountable
for their actions. In its decision, the Court weakened . . . Section 1981, which
requires that all citizens have the same rights to make and enforce contracts
as white persons.”).
10. See infra notes 290291 and accompanying text.
11. Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory
Interpretation Methodology, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1866 (2008).
12. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621,
625 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, The New Textualism].
13. See Brief of Respondent Arizona Secretary of State Katie Hobbs at
1820, Brnovich v. Dem. Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021) (No. 18-15845)
(relying heavily on the reasoning in Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr.
Am.-Owned Media, and Bostock v. Clayton County, in which Justice Gorsuch
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Even before his appointment to the Supreme Court,
then-Judge Gorsuch’s statutory interpretation analysis served
as precedent to other judgesprecedent that severely restricted
individual rights while purporting to merely effectuate the will
of Congress.14 Because Justice Gorsuch’s opinions exemplify
muscular textualism in a structured and consistent manner, his
appointment to the Supreme Court provides the forum from
which he can influence the decision-making process of other
members of the judiciary when they seek guidance from
Supreme Court precedent.15 It is important for both advocates
and judges to understand the muscular textualist analysis and
its often rights-restrictive results.
Sometimes in the majority and sometimes in the dissent,
Justice Gorsuch’s rigorous adherence to what he perceives to be
the “plain language” of the text stands out.16 Justice Gorsuch’s
authored the majority opinions, to interpret Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act).
14. In United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 2015), the
Fourth Circuit interpreted the “savings clause” of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id. at 244.
The majority relied heavily on Judge Gorsuch’s extraordinarily narrow
interpretation of the same statute in Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578 (10th
Cir. 2011) to reach a similarly narrow result. See Surratt, 797 F.3d at 25159
(citing repeatedly to Prost); Prost, 636 F.3d at 57980 (finding that the
defendant had no right to appeal his sentence even though the United States
Supreme Court had re-interpreted the statute under which the defendant had
been convicted such that he might not have been convicted at all if tried under
the new interpretation); see also Brandon Hasbrouck, Saving Justice: Why
Sentencing Errors Fall Within the Savings Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), 108
GEO. L.J. 287, 30103 (2019) (explaining Judge Gorsuch’s reasoning in Prost);
Leah M. Litman, Judge Gorsuch and Johnson Resentencing (This is Not a
Joke), 115 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 67, 67 (2017) (stating that Judge Gorsuch’s
opinion in Prost “overvalues proceduralism relative to substantive rights in a
way that will have the effect of eroding litigants’ access to courts”).
15. See supra notes 1113; Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 12,
at 652 (stating that then-Judge Scalia was bound by Supreme Court practice
while sitting on the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit).
16. See Victoria Nourse, Textualism 3.0: Statutory Interpretation After
Justice Scalia, 70 ALA. L. REV. 667, 682 (2019) (discussing Justice Gorsuch’s
approach to statutory interpretation); Romag Fasteners, Inc., v. Fossil, Inc.,
140 S. Ct. 1492, 1494 (2020) (stating that a categorical rule adopted by several
circuits cannot be upheld unless it “can be reconciled with the statute’s plain
language”); Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., 140 S. Ct. 1367, 1381 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (rejecting an interpretation of a statute that would
preclude judicial review of agency decisions in light of the statute’s “plain
language”); Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1486 (2021) (“[N]o amount
of policy-talk can overcome a plain statutory command. Our only job today is
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muscular textualism departs from new textualism, the theory of
statutory interpretation that Justice Scalia promoted, in several
respects.
This Note focuses on two main differences between
muscular textualism and new textualism, which is most notable
for its insistence that judges rely on the words in the statute and
reject consideration of legislative history.17 First, new
textualism relies on “ordinary meaning,” focusing on the
common-sense, colloquial understanding of the words in the
statute.18 While Justice Gorsuch also purports to adhere to
“ordinary meaning,” muscular textualism frequently looks to
the statute’s “literal meaning,” as derived from dictionaries as
opposed to contemporaneous usage.19 This makes muscular
textualism more literal than new textualism, because it adheres
to the most basic, narrow, and superficial interpretation rather
than exploring the nuances of the phrase at issue.20 The
resulting interpretation is frequently more akin to “strict
constructionism,” an interpretive method that focuses on the

to give the law’s terms their ordinary meaning . . . . [W]ords are how the law
constrains power.”); BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1542
(2021) (“‘[E]ven the most formidable’ policy arguments cannot ‘overcome’ a
clear statutory directive. . . . [T]his Court’s task is to discern and apply the
law’s plain meaning as faithfully as we can, not to ‘assess the consequences of
each approach and adopt the one that produces the least mischief.’” (internal
citations omitted)).
17. See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV.
1287, 1288 (2010) [hereinafter Manning, Second-Generation Textualism]
(“Textualism maintains that judges seek statutory meaning in the semantic
import of the enacted text and, in so doing, should reject the longstanding
practice of using unenacted legislative history as authoritative evidence of
legislative intent or purpose.”).
18. See infra notes 6070 and accompanying text.
19. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231 (1993) (considering both
the “commonsense meaning” and “dictionary definition” of the term “sole” as
used in the Impeachment Clause of the Constitution); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 328 (2012)
(“Ordinary meaning should be distinguished from literal meaning or strict
construction; the latter connotes a narrow understanding of words used, while
the former connotes the everyday understanding.”); Niz-Chavez v. Garland,
141 S. Ct. 1474, 148081 (2021) (purporting to search for the ordinary meaning
but then relying heavily on grammar and usage treatises).
20. See infra Part II.A.
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most narrow, literal meaning of the words, ignoring all
context.21
Second, muscular textualism takes a much more
constrained view of what context interpreters may consider to
discover the proper meaning of the text.22 New textualism relies
much more heavily on “subtextual context,” textual context
beyond the words in the phrase at issue and their definitions.
Subtextual context includes other sections of the act, the
structure of the act, or prior judicial interpretations of the
terms.23 New textualism also permits some consideration of
certain types of extratextual context, including the historical
and cultural background against which the statute was
enacted—the text’s “social context”—which muscular
textualism rejects.24 The result is that Justice Gorsuch’s
muscular textualism focuses more narrowly on the statutory
text than Justice Scalia’s new textualism.25
This Note does not purport to provide a comprehensive
analytical framework. Instead, it focuses on two distinct
nuances exemplified in Justice Gorsuch’s opinions and
highlighted by the dissents in Bostock.26 It also does not claim
to describe how Justice Gorsuch conceptualizes interpretive
issues. It merely outlines the theory of statutory interpretation
that judges or practitioners can derive from Justice Gorsuch’s
statutory interpretation jurisprudence based on the recurring
themes in his opinions. To do so, it draws primarily on the
statutory opinions he authored during his first five years on the
Supreme Court and contrasts those opinions with
new-textualist scholarship.

21. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 427 (2012) (defining strict constructionism as
“[a]n interpretation according to the literal meaning of words, as contrasted
with what the words denote in context according to a fair reading”).
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part II.B.24.
24. See infra Part II.B.1; Grove, supra note 8, at 28081 (distinguishing
between different types of context).
25. See Nourse, supra note 16, at 668 (“Justice Scalia is rightly deserving
of praise for his insistence that statutory interpretation return to the text.”);
Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 148082 (focusing narrowly on the meaning of the
word “a”).
26. See supra notes 1825 and accompanying text.
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Part I provides some background on interpretive
methodologies.27 Part II outlines and explains the muscular
textualism framework.28 Part III applies the framework
developed in Part II to two interpretive issues that split the
circuits.29 Finally, the Conclusion points to the potential impact
of muscular textualism beyond the confines of statutory
interpretation.30 Of course, at this stage it is impossible to
predict what the impact of Justice Gorsuch’s Supreme Court
appointment will be, but it has become clear that he brings new
ideas to many areas of the law that foreshadow change for many
long-established doctrines.31 Consequently, scholars, advocates,
and the judiciary must grapple with his jurisprudence.
I.

NEW TEXTUALISM

Until the 1980s, the Court frequently rejected “the apparent
import of a statutory text” in favor of legislative intent or
purpose as expressed in the legislative history.32 The “prevailing
judicial orthodoxy”33 of the twentieth century is commonly
known as “strong purposivism.”34 Strong purposivism permits
judges “to consider virtually any contextual evidence, especially
the statute’s legislative history, even when the statutory text
has an apparent ‘plain meaning.’”35
New textualism arose in response to strong purposivism in
the 1980s when scholars and judges “began to explore the
tension between strong purposivism and legislative
supremacy.”36 New textualists challenged purposivists’

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra CONCLUSION.
See infra CONCLUSION.
Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, supra note 17, at 1291.
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 70, 73 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides Textualists
from Purposivists].
34. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 23 (2006) (discussing the history of interpretive methodology in the
Supreme Court).
35. Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 12, at 621.
36. Molot, supra note 34, at 24.
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willingness to ignore the statute’s text in favor of its purpose.37
The success of this movement is, in large part, credited to
Justice Scalia’s appointment to the Supreme Court38 and his
“specially concurring or dissenting opinions arguing that the
Court should ignore legislative history.”39 Today, textualism is
the dominant interpretive methodology among members of the
judiciary.40 Perhaps due in part to new textualism’s resounding
success, textualism is no longer a uniform interpretive
methodology.41 With the Court’s increasing rejection of
purposivism in favor of textualism, “the divisions within
textualism” become apparent, as judges and scholars continue
to debate the best way to reach the text’s plain meaning.42
Though new textualists purport to limit their analysis to
the text of the statute, “the very process of ascertaining textual
meaning inescapably entails resorting to extrastatutoryand
thus unenactedcontextual clues.”43 Thus, the dispute between
purposivists and textualists is not whether to consider statutory
context, but rather which context to consider and how much
weight to give to it.44 Viewed in this light, muscular textualism
37. See Grove, supra note 8, at 273 (“Beginning in the 1980s,
textualistsled by Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrookmounted a
campaign against this focus on the purpose and spirit, rather than the words,
of a statute.”).
38. See Nourse, supra note 16, at 668 (“Justice Scalia is rightly deserving
of praise for his insistence that statutory interpretation return to the text.”).
39. See Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 12, at 651.
40. See Harv. L. Sch., The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice
Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE at 8:29 (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://perma.cc/TUU9-QRBC (“[We are] all textualists now . . . .”).
41. See Nourse, supra note 16, at 668 (explaining that some Supreme
Court Justices are “hard and dramatic textualists” while others are “low-key
and pluralistic textualists”).
42. Grove, supra note 8, at 267; see Nourse, supra note 16, at 668 (“If the
decisions of 2018 are any indication, a unified method has not led to unified
results. The truth is that textualism seems a neutral term that in fact is
nothing but neutral. It harbors opposites.”).
43. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, supra note 33,
at 75.
44. See id. at 76 (“[T]extualists and purposivists emphasize different
elements of context. Textualists give precedence to semantic contextevidence
that goes to the way a reasonable person would use language under the
circumstances. Purposivists give priority to policy contextevidence that
suggests the way a reasonable person would address the mischief being
remedied.”).
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is not something completely new, but rather a continuation of
the debate over how much weight to give to various types of
context.45
Some scholars have argued that “[t]extualists have been so
successful discrediting strong purposivism . . . that they can no
longer identify, let along conquer, any remaining territory
between textualism’s adherents and nonadherents.”46
Responding to these arguments, Professor Jonathan Siegel
contended that textualism’s “prime directive”that the “text is
the law, and it is the text that must be observed”has an
“expansionist quality that causes textualism to become more
radical with time.”47 He argues that this “fundamental axiom,
combined with the tendency of the law to work itself pure, will
keep textualists fighting indefinitely.”48 Textualists seem to be
winning the fightmuscular textualism is a significant step
toward “the radicalization” of textualist interpretation.49
II.

JUSTICE GORSUCH’S INFLUENCE: THE MUSCULAR
TEXTUALISM FRAMEWORK

Justice Gorsuch is a self-professed textualist.50 But his
opinions show that his approach to textualism differs from new
45. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative
Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA &
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012))
[V]irtually all theorists and judges are “textualists” in the sense
that they consider the text the starting point for statutory
interpretation and follow statutory plain meaning if the text is
clear. However . . . virtually all theorists and judges are also
“purposivists” in the sense that all believe that statutory
interpretation ought to advance statutory purposes, so long as such
interpretations do not impose on words a meaning they will not
bear. And virtually all theorists and judges insist that statutory
context is important in discerning the meaning of statutory texts.
46. Molot, supra note 34, at 2.
47. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 117, 12021 (2009) (internal quotation omitted).
48. Id. at 122.
49. Id. at 170.
50. See NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 10 (2019) (“For
me, respect for the separation of powers implies . . . textualism in the
interpretation of statutes.”); cf. Franklin, supra note 2, at 8
[The problem] with textualism, from a democratic perspective, is
that it vastly aggrandizes judicial power. It enables judges to rely
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textualism as championed by Justice Scalia.51 One notable
difference is that muscular textualism is more literal than new
textualism.52 It is also more rigid with regard to what subtextual
and historical context the interpreter may consider to determine
the “ordinary public meaning of [a statute’s] terms at the time
of its enactment.”53 The result is frequently a narrow
construction of the language and disregard for the harm that the
statute was passed to redress.54
A.

Muscular Textualism’s Strong Inclination Toward
Literalness

Muscular textualism is occasionally reminiscent of strict
constructionism in that it looks to the literal meaning of the
statutory language.55 New textualists have decisively rejected
on normative and other forms of extratextual judgment while
denying that they are doing so; it enables them to decide matters of
paramount social importance without providing the people and
their elected representatives with a complete account of their
reasoning. That creates democratic accountability problems, and it
also creates rule-of-law problems. It liberates judges from the
burden of demonstrating that their conclusions are based in law
and it deprives those governed by law of any real sense of the
principles guiding judicial interpretation and of the likely
implications of legal precedent.
51. See Grove, supra note 8, at 267 (differentiating between the
“formalistic textualism” Justice Gorsuch applied in Bostock and the “flexible
textualism” the dissents applied).
52. See infra Part II.A.
53. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020)
After all, only the words on the page constitute the law adopted by
Congress and approved by the President. If judges could add to,
remodel, update, or detract from old statutory terms inspired only
by extratextual sources and our own imaginations, we would risk
amending statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the
people’s representatives. And we would deny the people the right to
continue relying on the original meaning of the law they have
counted on to settle their rights and obligations.
see Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480 (2021) (“When exhausting
[all textual and structural] clues enables us to resolve the interpretive
question put to us, our ‘sole function’ is to apply the law as we find it.”); infra
Part II.B.
54. See infra Part III.
55. Cf. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Time and
again, this Court has rejected literalism in favor of ordinary meaning.”);
Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1491 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Ordinary
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strict constructionism.56 Justice Scalia called it “a degraded
form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy into
disrepute.”57 While Justice Gorsuch has not embraced strict
constructionism explicitly, muscular textualism’s literalism is
evident in his opinions.58
In Bostock, Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority,
contended that the Court must interpret Title VII’s59 prohibition
of discrimination on the basis of sex “in accord with the ordinary

meaning and literal meaning are two different things. And judges interpreting
statutes should follow ordinary meaning, not literal meaning.”). To be sure,
Justice Gorsuch pointed out that judges “must be attuned to the possibility
that a statutory phrase ordinarily bears a different meaning than the terms
do when viewed individually or literally.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1750 (majority
opinion). But an examination of his jurisprudence shows that he favors the
literal meaning. See infra notes 6981 and accompanying text.
56. See Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 376 (2005)
(“[N]o mainstream judge is interested solely in the literal definitions of a
statute’s words . . . .”); Siegel, supra note 47, at 154 (“Good textualists do not
insist that text must be interpreted literally and without consideration of
context.”); Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, supra note
33, at 81 n.40 (“Even within the realm of ordinary meaning, textualists must
be sensitive to the fact that words sometimes have colloquial meanings that
are widely understood but too obscure to have made their way into standard
definitions.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 21, at 39 (“Some judges . . . diverge
from [textualism] by ‘strict constructionism’a hyperliteral form of textualism
that we equally reject.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 21, at 356 (“Textualists
should object to being called strict constructionists. Whether they know it or
not, that is an irretrievably pejorative term, as it ought to be. Strict
constructionism, as opposed to fair-reading textualism, is not a doctrine to be
taken seriously.”).
57. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997) (“[T]he good
textualist is not a literalist . . . .”).
58. See Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1484
[W]hen interpreting this or any statute, we do not aim for “literal”
interpretations . . . . We simply seek the law’s ordinary
meaning. . . . If, in the process of discerning that meaning, we
happen to consult grammar and dictionary definitions . . . we do so
because the rules that govern language often inform how ordinary
people understand the rules that govern them.
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority
of following the text’s “literal meaning” instead of its “ordinary meaning”);
Leah Litman & Kate Shaw, Burn Book on Purposivism, STRICT SCRUTINY at
18:30 (May 3, 2021), https://perma.cc/WDA2-RR7A (contrasting Justice
Kavanaugh’s ordinary meaning and Justice Gorsuch’s literal meaning).
59. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701716, 78 Stat. 241,
25366 (1964).
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public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment.”60 The
majority proceeded to interpret the statute’s text by relying on
prior Supreme Court interpretations, contemporaneous
dictionary definitions, and, to a lesser extent, the text of the rest
of the statute.61 This is consistent with new textualism.62 But
there was significant discord between the majority and
dissenting opinions, all of which purported to be correctly
following the textualist method, as to whether an employer who
fires an employee because of his or her sexual orientation or
sexual identity discriminated against that employee because of
“sex.” Both dissenting opinions accuse the majority of
dishonoring the most fundamental principle of new textualism:
that only the statutory text itself, as understood at the time of
its enactment, carries the force of law.63 Justice Alito compared
the majority’s opinion to a pirate ship.64 He stated that the
opinion “sails under a textualist flag, but what it actually
represents is a theory of statutory interpretation that Justice
Scalia excoriatedthe theory that courts should ‘update’ old
statutes so that they better reflect the current values of
society.”65
Justice Kavanaugh’s criticism was less rhetorical, but it
portrayed the majority opinion more accurately. He accused the
majority of applying “[a] literalist approach to interpreting
phrases [that] disrespects ordinary meaning and deprives the
60. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (majority opinion); see BP P.L.C. v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 (2021) (“When called on to interpret a
statute, this Court generally seeks to discern and apply the ordinary meaning
of its terms at the time of their adoption.”).
61. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 173941 (interpreting Title VII’s prohibition
of discrimination because of sex).
62. See Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U.S. 121, 128 n.2 (2015)
(Thomas, J.) (stating that the court must “look to the ordinary meaning” of the
words in the statute at the time they were enacted); SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 21, at 6992 (explaining the ordinary-meaning and fixed-meaning
canons).
63. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1835 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for “overlooking
the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘discriminate because of sex’”).
64. See id. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court attempts to pass off
its decision as the inevitable product of the textualist school of statutory
interpretation championed by our late colleague Justice Scalia, but no one
should be fooled.”).
65. Id. at 175556.
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citizenry of fair notice of what the law is.”66 As he further stated,
“[T]his Court’s precedents and longstanding principles of
statutory interpretation teach a clear lesson: Do not simply split
statutory phrases into their component words, look up each in a
dictionary, and then mechanically put them together
again . . . . [T]his approach misses the forest for the trees.”67 But
frequently this is exactly what lower court judges and advocates
see when looking to muscular textualist opinions for guidance.68
Bostock and Justice Gorsuch’s other opinions break down the
language at issue and first look at the dictionary definitions of
the terms.69 This differs significantly from new textualism,
which looks to subtextual context first.70

66. Id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1827.
68. See supra notes 1113 and accompanying text.
69. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 173940 (majority opinion) (looking to
contemporaneous dictionaries to determine the contemporary understanding
of the statutory terms); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian, 140 S. Ct. 1335, 1364
(2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same); Food
Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2363 (2019) (same); BNSF
Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 893, 906 (2019) (same); New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira,
139 S. Ct. 532, 541 (2019) (same); Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2067, 2071 (2018) (same); Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784, 787 (2018) (same);
BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 153738 (same).
70. See Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., 978 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir.
1992) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Statutes have meanings, sometimes even ‘plain’ ones,
but these do not spring directly from the page . . . . Slicing a statute into
phrases while ignoring their contextsthe surrounding words, the setting of
the enactment, the function a phrase serves in the statutory structureis a
formula for disaster.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 21, at 356 (“The full body
of a text contains implications that can alter the literal meaning of individual
terms.”); ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 19, at 253
[J]udges have used the term “plain meaning” loosely, sometimes to
mean a textual interpretation that is pretty obvious on the face of
the statute . . . and sometimes to mean something similar to Justice
Scalia’s expression of the best textual understanding that emerges
from close analysis of statutory provisions that, at the outset, may
have seemed ambiguous, confusing or at least complicated. The
former approach to plain meaning is akin to a pretty literal
approach to the face of the statute; the latter approach of Justice
Scalia sees statutory interpretation to be something like a word
puzzle, capable of being solved in almost all cases with a best
answer emerging.
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For example, in New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira,71 the Court
faced the question of whether the statutory term “contracts of
employment” includes “contracts that require an independent
contractor to do work,” or only “contracts that reflect an
employer-employee relationship.”72 The employer in Oliveira
sought to compel arbitration under its contract with the
employee.73 Under the Federal Arbitration Act,74 courts do not
have authority to compel arbitration for “contracts of
employment” of workers engaged in interstate commerce.75
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, began with the
definition of the term “employment” in various dictionaries from
1925, the year the statute was enacted.76 He determined that
the contemporaneous dictionary definition includes contracts of
independent contractors as well as contracts establishing
employer-employee relationships.77 Only then did Justice
Gorsuch look to the context supplied by the rest of the
sentence.78 The majority concluded that the term “workers” in
the second half of the sentence confirmed what it had gleaned
from the dictionaries: “that Congress used the term ‘contracts of
employment’ in a broad sense to capture any contract for the
performance of work by workers.”79 Of course, new textualism
also relies heavily on dictionary definitions of the terms at
issue.80 The difference lies in the relative amounts of weight
71. 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019).
72. Id. at 539.
73. Id. at 536.
74. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
75. See Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. at 53637 (explaining the scope of the Act).
76. See id. (“It turns out . . . that the dictionaries of the era consistently
afforded the word ‘employment’ a broad construction, broader than may be
often found in dictionaries today.”).
77. See id. at 540 (stating that in 1925 “[a]ll work was treated as
employment, whether or not the common law criteria for a master-servant
relationship happened to be satisfied”).
78. See id. (“More confirmation yet comes from a neighboring term in the
statutory text.”).
79. Id. at 541.
80. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2387, 2456 (2005) [hereinafter Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine]
(“[T]extualists . . . frequently consult dictionaries as historical records of social
meanings that speakers have attached to words . . . .”); SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 21, at 36 (“With a terminological issue . . . we should consult
(without apology) what the lexicographers say.”).
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given to the dictionary definitions and the immediate context of
the text.81
While Justice Gorsuch routinely begins with the dictionary,
Justice Scalia’s opinions may not even reach the dictionary. For
example, in West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey,82
Justice Scalia relied on other statutes and Court precedent to
interpret the fee shifting provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1988.83 The
question before the Court was whether expert witness costs can
be shifted to the losing party under § 1988, which permits
shifting of “a reasonable attorney’s fee.”84 Justice Scalia first
consulted the language of fee shifting provisions in other
statutes, particularly noting that several expressly permit
shifting of expert witness costs.85 He concluded that “this
statutory usage shows beyond question that attorney’s fees and
expert fees are distinct items of expense.”86 He then turned to
the “judicial background” that existed before the enactment of
§ 1988, and determined that judicial practices at the time
confirmed the conclusion.87 He never consulted dictionary
81. Compare SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 21, at 167 (“Context is a
primary determinant of meaning.”), with Nourse, supra note 16, at 673 (stating
that Justice Gorsuch’s opinions further emphasize the “‘intense
decontextualization’ (meaning the intensification of text-parsing methodology)
that began with Justice Scalia’s new textualism”).
82. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. While Casey may initially appear to be
distinguishable from Justice Gorsuch’s statutory interpretation jurisprudence
because the language at issue in Casey is specific to the judicial process, this
argument does not hold. In Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018),
Justice Gorsuch, writing in dissent, interpreted the tolling provision in 28
U.S.C. § 1367(d). See 138 S. Ct. at 608 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (setting out
the disputed statutory terms). This provision, like § 1988, governs the judicial
process. But here too, Justice Gorsuch began by consulting contemporaneous
dictionaries to determine the meaning of the word “toll.” See Artis, 138 S. Ct.
at 606 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“The dictionary informs us that to ‘toll’ means
‘[t]o take away bar, defeat [or] annul.’” (quoting Toll, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)) (alterations in original)).
84. Casey, 499 U.S. at 85 (quoting § 1988) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added).
85. See id. at 88 (“While some fee-shifting provisions, like § 1988, refer
only to ‘attorney’s fees,’ many others explicitly shift expert witness fees as well
as attorney’s fees.” (internal citation omitted)).
86. Id. at 92.
87. See id. at 9297 (examining fee shifting practices before the statute’s
enactment).
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definitions of “attorney’s fees.”88 By beginning with the
dictionary definitions of the terms at issue, muscular textualism
departs from new textualism in that it interprets the statute
based on its literal rather than its ordinary meaning.89
Because muscular textualism is more literal than new
textualism, muscular textualists90 are less likely to conclude
that the text is ambiguous.91 During the Court’s October 2019
term, for example, Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion
or a separate opinion in six statutory interpretation cases.92 He
only found the language to be ambiguous in one case, Comcast
Corp. v. National Association of African American-Owned
Media,93 discussed in Part II.C, where the statute did not
address the issue before the Court.94 In several of the cases
88. See id. at 8897 (relying exclusively on “statutory” and “judicial
usage”).
89. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1828 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Statutory interpretation 101 instructs courts to
follow ordinary meaning not literal meaning, and to adhere to the ordinary
meaning of phrases, not just the meaning of the words in a phrase.”).
90. This Note recognizes that not all judges adopt one method of statutory
interpretation. For simplicity’s sake, however, this Note will refer to those
applying a muscular textualist analysis as “muscular textualists.”
91. See Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 80, at 239293
Even the strictest modern textualists properly emphasize that
language is a social construct. They ask how a reasonable person,
conversant with the relevant social and linguistic conventions
would read the text in context. This approach recognizes that the
literal or dictionary definitions of words will often fail to account for
settled nuances or background conventions that qualify the literal
meaning of the language, and, in particular, of legal language.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 21, at 356 (“Adhering to the fair meaning of the
text (the textualist’s touch-stone) does not limit one to the hyperliteral
meaning of each word in the text.”).
92. See generally Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (interpreting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e); Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 140 S. Ct. 1601 (2020) (interpreting 28
U.S.C. § 1605); Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492 (2020)
(interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1117); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian, 140 S. Ct. 1335
(2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (interpreting 42
U.S.C. § 9622); Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 314); Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (interpreting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981).
93. 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020).
94. See id. at 1015 (“While the statute’s text does not expressly discuss
causation, it is suggestive.”).
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where Justice Gorsuch’s muscular textualist analysis found the
text to be unambiguous, other justices disagreed.95
In SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu,96 SAS brought several claims
against another company’s patents.97 The statute provides that
“[i]f inter partes review is instituted” by the Director, the Board
“shall issue a final decision with respect to the patentability of
any claim challenged by the petitioner.”98 The Director of the
Patent Office claimed that “he retain[ed] discretion to decide”
which claims would receive inter partes review by the Board.99
The Court had to determine whether the phrase “any patent
claim challenged by the petitioner,” as used in 35 U.S.C.
§ 318(a),100 required review of every claim in the original
petition or whether it permitted the Director to decide which
claims would receive review.101 The majority’s muscular
textualist analysis, authored by Justice Gorsuch, concluded that
the language was unambiguous.102 He relied on the words
“shall” and “any” in the statute, which, he claimed, created a
nondiscretionary duty on the part of the Board to consider “every
claim the petitioner ha[d] challenged.”103
Justice Breyer, joined by three other justices, disagreed.104
Justice Breyer stated, “The words ‘in the petitioner’s original
petition’ do not appear in the statute. And the words that do
appear, ‘any patent claim challenged by the petitioner,’ could be

95. See Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2075 (2018)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In my view, the language itself is ambiguous.”). But
see Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 60203 (2018) (stating that
the language at issue has only one permissible meaning while Justice Gorsuch,
dissenting, found that it had two).
96. 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
97. See id. at 1354 (explaining the facts that gave rise to the litigation).
98. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).
99. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1355.
100. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).
101. See Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1361 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining the
issue before the Court).
102. See id. at 1355 (majority opinion) (“We find that the plain text of
§ 318(a) supplies a ready answer.”).
103. Id. at 1354.
104. See id. at 1361 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I cannot find much in the
statutory context to support the majority’s claim that the statutory words
‘challenged by the petitioner’ refer unambiguously to claims challenged
initially in the petition.”).

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

1123

modified by using different words that similarly do not
appear . . . .”105 The statute did not reveal “whether the relevant
challenge is one made in the initial petition or only one made in
the inter partes review proceeding itself.”106 Because Justice
Gorsuch focused narrowly on the literal meaning of two specific
words in the statute, “shall” and “any,” he did not find the
ambiguity that Justice Breyer’s broader approach identified.107
Muscular textualism’s enhanced literalism makes it less
likely that the analysis will find ambiguity in the text, which
means that it will rely on subtextual and extratextual context
less frequently.108 This phenomenon is particularly clear if one
compares muscular textualism to purposivism. In United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber,109 a quintessential purposivist
opinion, Justice Brennan wrote, “[I]t is a ‘familiar rule that a
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention
of its makers.’”110 He acknowledged that the “literal
construction” of the statute was unambiguous but nonetheless
turned to the statute’s context because of the ambiguity created
by the disagreement between the statute’s plain terms and its
purpose.111 Thus, even though the statute was clear, Justice

105. Id. at 136162.
106. Id. at 1362.
107. See id. at 1360 (stating that the statute contains “a gap that Congress
implicitly delegated authority to the agency to fill”).
108. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (“This
Court has explained many times over many years that, when the meaning of
the statute’s terms is plain, our job is at an end.”); Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus
Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019)
In statutory interpretation disputes, a court’s proper starting point
lies in a careful examination of the ordinary meaning and structure
of the law itself. Where, as here, that examination yields a clear
answer, judges must stop. Even those of us who sometimes consult
legislative history will never allow it to be used to “muddy” the
meaning of “clear statutory language.” (quoting Milner v. Dep’t of
Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 672 (2011)) (internal citations omitted).
109. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
110. Id. at 201 (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S.
457, 459 (1892)).
111. See id. at 202 (“[A]n interpretation of [Title VII] that forbade all
race-conscious affirmative action would ‘bring about an end completely at
variance with the purpose of the statute’ and must be rejected.” (citation
omitted)).
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Brennan’s purposivist opinion in Weber not only considered
context but ignored the unambiguous text in favor of that
context.
By contrast, new textualists maintain “that courts must
respect the terms of an enacted text when its semantic meaning
is clear,” and refuse to let context such as statutory purpose
override the statutory text.112 The disparate use of context is
therefore less extreme between muscular textualism and new
textualism than between muscular textualism and
purposivism.113 But because new textualists “accept the
contemporary notion that language only has meaning when
considered in context,” they, too, look further than muscular
textualism permits to determine whether the text is
ambiguous.114 For example, new textualism applies canons of
construction to determine the ordinary meaning of the text,
while muscular textualism first determines the text’s meaning
and, as long as the meaning is unambiguous, rejects application
of any canons that point to a different result.115 Because the new
textualist’s approach to interpretation is more permissive about
context, new textualists are more likely to find ambiguity.116

112. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, supra note 17, at 1309.
113. Id.
114. Molot, supra note 34, at 35.
115. Compare Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, supra
note 33, at 92
Textualists start with contextual evidence that goes to customary
usage and habits of speech; they believe that a statute may have a
clear semantic meaning, even if that meaning is not plain to the
ordinary
reader
without
further
examination . . . . This
inquiry . . . also includes consideration of specialized trade usage,
substantive canons of clear statement . . . and colloquial nuances
that may be widely understood but are unrecorded in standard
dictionaries.
with United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2332 (2020) (stating that the
constitutional avoidance canon cannot be applied “to expand the reach of a
criminal statute in order to save it”).
116. But see John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10911 (2001) (explaining that new textualism’s
consideration of context precludes some interpretations of the language that a
more literal approach might permit).
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What Context Should Be Considered?

In the early 2000s, Professor Jonathan Molot alleged that
new textualism routinely looks at context beyond the four
corners of the statute.117 This is, of course, true.118 But new
textualism narrowed the scope of permissible context, primarily
by excluding legislative history from consideration.119 Muscular
textualism continues that trend by focusing almost exclusively
on semantic context, as portrayed by the terms of the statute
and their definitions.120 Even similar language in other statutes
is rarely given any weight.121 But the overall structure of the
statutory scheme is still relevant,122 as is statutory history.123
1.

Social Context Is Ignored

New textualism acknowledges that “meaning is a function
of the way speakers use language in particular
circumstances.”124 Because dictionary definitions cannot
capture these nuances, new textualists must necessarily
determine a statute’s meaning based on the social context in
which it was enacted.125 By contrast, muscular textualists weigh
textual context more heavily than social context and societal
117. See Molot, supra note 34, at 35 (“[T]extualists may criticize strong
purposivism for giving too much weight to context, and for emphasizing
certain kinds of context (legislative history) that textualists think should be
off limits, but modern textualists do not, in principle, object to the notion that
judges should look to context as well as text.”).
118. See Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in
Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1028 (1998) (“Textualism is not
‘wooden’; it recognizes that consulting context is part of the interpretive
process.”).
119. See id. at 102829 (“Textualists simply deny that legislative history
forms part of that context. Rather, they say, the context comes from elsewhere:
from, for example, dictionaries, or from the whole statute . . . or from other
statutes in which similar language is used.”).
120. See infra Part II.B.1.
121. See infra Part II.B.2.
122. See infra Part II.B.3.
123. See infra Part II.B.4.
124. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 80, at 2457.
125. See id. at 2458 (“[B]ecause dictionaries have a limited capacity to
record the nuances of usage, widely shared contextual understandings may
identify colloquial refinements of even the most locally applicable dictionary
definitions.”).

1126

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1105 (2021)

understandings of the language at the time of enactment.126
Dissenting in Bostock, Justice Alito stated, “If every single living
American had been surveyed in 1964, it would have been hard
to find any who thought that discrimination because of sex
meant discrimination because of sexual orientationnot to
mention gender identity, a concept that was essentially
unknown at the time.”127 Justice Alito’s dissent was joined in full
by Justice Thomas, one of the Court’s strictest adherents to new
textualism.128 Conversely, the majority’s muscular textualist
analysis gave the text “the ordinary public meaning of its terms
at the time of its enactment.”129 It looked at “the words on the
page” not at how the average citizen or congressperson would
have interpreted them.130 The majority’s interpretation was
based on contemporaneous dictionary definitions of the
individual terms, not contemporaneous societal understanding
of the phrase.131 While the majority relied on dictionaries, the
dissent derived the statute’s meaning based on the inferences it
drew from contemporaneous usage of the terms.132 Unlike the
dissent, the majority did not give the phrase its “ordinary public

126. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (“When
the express terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual
considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the
law . . . .”).
127. Id. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting); see Grove, supra note 8, at 28384
(explaining that the majority and dissent reached different conclusions
because of their disparate treatment of social context).
128. See Grove, supra note 8, at 283 (stating that Justice Thomas “has
been described as one of the Court’s ‘most committed textualists’” (citation
omitted)).
129. Id. at 1738 (emphasis added).
130. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 173839 (majority opinion) (“[W]e . . . begin
by examining the key statutory terms in turn before assessing their impact on
the cases at hand and then confirming our work against this Court’s
precedents.”).
131. See supra notes 6789 and accompanying text.
132. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1756 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that
“discrimination because of sex” cannot encompass the employer’s decision to
fire the employee because of her “gender identity, a concept that was
essentially unknown at the time”).
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meaning,” because it entirely ignored contemporaneous social
context.133
Bostock is just one example of muscular textualism’s
unequivocal disregard of social context. In United States v.
Davis,134 the Court interpreted the residual clause in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c),135 which defined a “crime of violence” as a felony “that
by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used.”136 The
question was whether this risk was based on the predicate
offense’s “imagined ‘ordinary case’” or “the defendant’s actual
conduct.”137 The majority determined that the statute refers to
the “ordinary case,” not the specific facts of the case.138 The
dissent argued that an average member of the public would not
agree with the majority’s rejection of a case-specific
interpretation of the text.139 Justice Gorsuch, writing for the
majority, dismissed this argument as “the dissent’s push poll.”140
Like in Bostock, the majority’s muscular textualist analysis
refused to consider contemporary societal usage of the phrase.141
If judges rely on these muscular textualist opinions for guidance
in future statutory interpretation cases, they will be less willing
to consider social context.142

133. See id. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts must adhere to
the ordinary meaning of phrases, not just the meaning of the words in a
phrase.” (emphasis added)).
134. 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B).
136. Id.
137. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 232728 (internal quotation omitted).
138. See id. at 2329 (“[I]n plain English, when we speak of the nature of
an offense, we’re talking about ‘what an offense normallyor, as we have
repeatedly said, “ordinarily”entails, not what happened to occur on one
occasion.’” (quoting Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1217 (2018))).
139. See id. at 2343 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (borrowing the Court of
Appeals’s argument that the public would disagree with the majority’s
interpretation).
140. Id. at 2334 (majority opinion).
141. See id. (defending its interpretation as “a categorical reading of this
categorical language [that] seemed anything but ‘unnatural’” to the Court in
prior cases).
142. See Grove, supra note 8, at 269 (“Formalistic textualism emphasizes
semantic context, rather than social or policy context . . . .”).
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Statutory Context Is Rarely Relevant

New textualism considers language in related or
surrounding statutes when interpreting the language or
provision at issue.143 Under a muscular textualist analysis, in
the absence of expressly clear language to the contrary, related
statutes have little bearing on the meaning of the provision at
issue.144 Even where two words are understood to be
synonymous in common parlance, only identical language can
inform the interpretation.145 In fact, the difference in language
is generally strong evidence that the two phrases cannot mean
the same thing.146
143. See Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 12, at 669 (“The new
textualism considers as context dictionaries and other grammar books, the
whole statute, analogous provisions in other statutes, canons of construction,
and the common sense God gave us.” (emphasis added)); SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 21, at 252 (“Any word or phrase that comes before a court for
interpretation is part of a whole statute, and its meaning is therefore affected
by other provisions of the same statute.”).
144. See Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367, 1381
(2020) (finding that a “determination by the Director” whether to institute
inter partes review is not the same as an affirmative temporal limitation
during which “inter partes review may not be instituted” (citing 35 U.S.C.
§§ 314(d), 315)); Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1903 (2019)
(finding that limiting language in another section applied only to “the
activities discussed in that same section” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021)); Opati v.
Republic of Sudan, 140 S. Ct. 1601, 1609 (2020) (finding that Congress
expressly made a new provision applicable to the provision at issue (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1605A)); Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Rsrv., 141 S. Ct.
2434, 2456 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (relying on another statute where
it uses “language materially identical to” the provision at issue in the case).
145. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian, 140 S. Ct. 1335, 1365 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting in part) (rejecting similar but not identical language
in another section as irrelevant because it would be “linguistic contortion” to
conclude that “different language” can have the same meaning); Comcast
Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1018 (2020)
(“[W]e normally assume [that] differences in language imply differences in
meaning.”); Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1814 (2019) (“[T]he
phrase ‘substantive legal standard,’ which appears in [§ 1395hh(a)(2)] and
apparently nowhere else in the U.S. Code, cannot bear the same construction
as the term ‘substantive rule’ in the APA.”); BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore,
141 S. Ct. 1532, 1539 (2021) (“[A]ll of the parties’ fencing about language
Congress didn’t use persuades us of only one thingthat we are best served
by focusing on the language it did employ.”).
146. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020) (noting
the significance of the fact that Congress took a “more parsimonious approach”
in other statutes); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 893, 907 (2019) (Gorsuch,
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Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion in Wisconsin Central
Ltd. v. United States147 illustrates this principle. In Wisconsin
Central, railroads sought refunds for employment taxes that
they claimed to have overpaid under the Railroad Retirement
Tax Act (RRTA).148 The Court had to determine whether the
railroad employee’s stock options constitute “money
remuneration” as that term is used in the RRTA.149 The
government argued that the statutory term “money” should be
defined broadly to include the stock options.150 The majority
rejected this argument.151 In so doing, it pointed out that
“differences in language . . . convey differences in meaning.”152
It stated that Congress “took pains to differentiate between
money and stock” throughout title 26 of the U.S. Code.153 The
majority also pointed out that the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA),154 “taxes ‘all remuneration,’” while
the RRTA “taxes only ‘money remuneration.’”155 The majority
deemed these textual discrepancies to be strong evidence that
“money remuneration” does not include the stock options and

J., dissenting) (concluding that because a related statute expressly includes
“‘pay for time lost’ in the definition of ‘compensation’” the statute at issue must
exclude such payments (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 231(h)(1))); BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct.
at 1538 (comparing the language in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which permits
appellate review of “an order” remanding a case after removal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1442, with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A), which refers to actions “‘removed
solely under’ the diversity jurisdiction statute”).
147. 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018).
148. Railroad Retirement Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 32013241; see Wis. Cent.
Ltd. v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 3d 728, 731 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (describing the
nature of the suit).
149. See Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2075 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(explaining the issue before the Court).
150. See id. at 2072 (majority opinion) (“At least sometimes, the
government says, ‘money’ means any ‘property or possessions of any kind
viewed as convertible into money or having value expressible in terms of
money.’” (citing Money, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1933))).
151. See id. (“[W]hile the term ‘money’ sometimes might be used in this
much more expansive sense, that isn’t how the term was ordinarily used at
the time of the Act’s adoption (or is even today).”).
152. Id. at 2071.
153. See id. (citing several examples from the 1939 Internal Revenue
Code).
154. Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. §§ 31013128.
155. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2071.
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therefore ruled in favor of the railroads.156 As Wisconsin Central
illustrates, a muscular textualist must generally conclude that
even slight discrepancies in the statutory language will change
the meaning of the text.157 Unless the language is identical,
specific language in related statutes provides evidence of what
the meaning is not, as opposed to what it is.158
3.

Statutory Structure Deserves Consideration

Though specific language in related statutes rarely informs
the interpretation, the general structure of the broader
statutory scheme does carry some weight.159 In Virginia
Uranium Inc. v. Warren,160 the question before the Court was
whether the Atomic Energy Act (AEA)161 preempted Virginia
state law.162 Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, applied a
muscular textualist analysis and concluded that the AEA did
not preempt state law.163 Virginia Uranium contended that the

156. See id. (“Pretty obviously, stock options do not fall within that
definition.”).
157. See supra notes 146156 and accompanying text.
158. Cf. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 761 (2021) (noting that
language mandating the burden of proof was identical for all four statutory
requirements and the plaintiff identified “nothing in the statutory text
singling out this lone requirement for special treatment”); id. (“Congress
knows how to assign the government the burden of [proof]. And Congress’s
decision to do so in some proceedings, but not in [the proceedings at issue],
reflects its choice that these different processes warrant different treatment.”).
159. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct.
1009, 1015 (2020) (discussing the effect of the “larger structure . . . of the Civil
Rights Act”); Va. Uranium Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1902 (2019)
(determining that the overall structure of the Act is a general rule with “a
notably narrow exception,” that the facts of the case do not fall under the
exception, and that they are thus covered by the general rule); Atl. Richfield
Co. v. Christian, 140 S. Ct. 1335, 1364 (2020) (noting the procedural focus of
the entire section); Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784, 789 (2018) (“The
surrounding statutory structure . . . suggests a statute that seeks to restrain,
rather than replicate, the discretion found in § 1988(b).”).
160. 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019).
161. 42 U.S.C. §§ 20112297h.
162. See Va. Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1900 (“Virginia Uranium insists that
the federal Atomic Energy Act preempts a state law banning uranium mining,
but we do not see it.”).
163. See id. (“[W]e are hardly free to extend a federal statute to a sphere
Congress was well aware of but chose to leave alone. In this, as in any field of
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AEA did preempt state law because it reserved “the regulation
of uranium mining . . . to the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC)] alone.”164 The majority first pointed out that “[u]nlike
many federal statutes, the AEA contain[ed] no provision
preempting state law in so many words.”165 It then turned to the
general structure of the broader statutory scheme to support
this conclusion.166 The majority read the statute as first
“announcing a general rule that mining regulation lies outside
the NRC’s jurisdiction,” before carving out “a notably narrow
exception” that the NRC may regulate uranium mining “[o]n
federal lands.”167 The opinion went on to discuss several other
federal statutes confirming this structure.168 The majority relied
on the general structure of the AEA to conclude that the federal
framework did not preempt state law because the facts did not
fall within the narrow exception that the statute established.169
Likewise, in Murphy v. Smith,170 Justice Gorsuch, again
writing for the majority, determined that the “surrounding
statutory structure” of the Prison Litigation Reform Act171
“suggest[ed] that the statute [sought] to restrain” the discretion
of the district courts.172 The question in that case was whether
the district court had discretion to vary the portion of attorney’s
fees that a prisoner-plaintiff who had prevailed in a § 1983173
action must pay before the burden to pay shifts to the
defendant.174 The statute stated that “a portion of the
statutory interpretation, it is our duty to respect not only what Congress wrote
but, as importantly, what it didn’t write.”).
164. See id. at 1901 (explaining the company’s argument).
165. See id. at 1902 (“Even more pointedly, the statute grants the NRC
extensive and sometimes exclusive authority to regulate nearly every aspect
of the nuclear fuel life cycle except mining.”).
166. See id. (“What the text states, context confirms.”).
167. See id. (describing the structure set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2097).
168. See id. (discussing §§ 2021, 2096).
169. See id. at 1900 (“But Congress conspicuously chose to leave untouched
the States’ historic authority over the regulation of mining activities on private
lands within their borders.”).
170. 138 S. Ct. 784 (2018).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
172. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 789.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
174. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 786 (describing the statutory interpretation
dispute in the case).
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[plaintiff’s] judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied
to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the
defendant . . . . [T]he excess shall be paid by the defendant.”175
The defendants maintained that the “court had to take
25% . . . from [the plaintiff’s] judgment before taxing [the
defendants] for the balance of the fee award.”176 But the trial
court only required the plaintiff to pay 10 percent of the
judgment before holding “the defendants responsible for the
rest.”177 In overturning the district court’s fee allocation, Justice
Gorsuch relied on the fact that “the other provisions of
§ 1997e(d) also limit the district court’s pre-existing
discretion.”178 He found the discretion-restricting nature of the
rest of § 1997e(d) to be evidence of the fact that the language at
issue served to restrain the district court’s discretion.179 This
example demonstrates that statutory structure is relevant to a
muscular textualist analysis, while the interpreter should
generally disregard specific language in other sections.180
4.

Statutory History Is Significant

In addition to statutory structure, muscular textualists also
consider statutory history.181 Statutory history consists of “the
statutes repealed or amended by the statute under

175. § 1997e(d)(2).
176. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 787.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 789.
179. See id. (discussing the statutory structure).
180. See supra Part II.B.2.
181. See WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129,
2142 (2018) (interpreting a statute that overruled a prior patent infringement
case to apply only to the type of infringement at issue in that case); SAS Inst.,
Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018) (“Congress’s choice to depart from
the model of a closely related statute is a choice neither we nor the agency may
disregard.”); Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784, 789 (2018) (“If Congress had
wished to confer the same discretion . . . we very much doubt that it would
have bothered to write a new law; omit all the words that afforded discretion
in the old law; and then replace those old discretionary words with new
mandatory ones.”); Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1484 (2021)
(determining that where the new statute “changed the name of the charging
document” and “changed the rules governing the documents contents” the
more permissive standard of the old statute could no longer apply).
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consideration.”182 It “form[s] part of the context of the statute,
and (unlike legislative history) can properly be presumed to
have been before all the members of the legislature when they
voted. So a change in the language of a prior statute presumably
connotes a change in meaning.”183 Though muscular textualism
is in some ways stricter than new textualism about what context
a court may permissibly consider, it takes new textualism’s
permissive view about statutory history.184
For example, Justice Gorsuch’s muscular textualist dissent
in BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos,185 joined in full by Justice Thomas,
looked to the RRTA’s statutory history.186 In BNSF Railway, the
Court had to determine whether an employee’s damage award
for injuries suffered due to the employer’s negligence constitutes
“taxable ‘compensation’ for ‘services rendered as an
employee.’”187 Justice Gorsuch’s dissent noted that an earlier
version of the statute “defined taxable ‘compensation’ to include
remuneration ‘for services rendered,’ but with the further
instruction that this included compensation ‘for time lost.’”188 In
1975, Congress “removed payments ‘for time lost’ from the
RRTA’s definition of ‘compensation.’”189 The dissent considered
this to be strong evidence that the statute’s language did not
embrace the damages at issue.190 It thus concluded that
damages for injury were not taxable compensation within the
meaning of the RRTA.191 As it was in this case, statutory history

182. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 21, at 256 (discussing the reenactment
canon).
183. Id.
184. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 893, 906 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (describing statutory history as “the sort of textual evidence
everyone agrees can sometimes shed light on meaning”).
185. 139 S. Ct. 893 (2019).
186. See id. at 907 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing the statute’s
history).
187. See id. at 904 (describing the issue before the Court) (quoting 26
U.S.C. § 3231(e)(1)).
188. Id. at 907 (citation omitted).
189. Id. (citation omitted).
190. See id. (“To my mind, Congress’s decision to remove the only language
that could have fairly captured the damages here cannot be easily ignored.”).
191. See id. at 904 (“When an employee suffers a physical injury due to his
employer’s negligence and has to sue in court to recover damages, it seems
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can be decisive evidence that a construction that aligns with the
meaning of old statutory language is not a permissible
interpretation of the present text.192
Muscular textualism is stricter than new textualism about
the subtextual and extratextual context that the interpreter can
consider.193 Social context and specific language in related
statutes is hardly given any weight.194 This characteristic
reinforces muscular textualism’s literalness and its heavy
reliance on contemporaneous dictionaries.195 But that is not to
say that muscular textualism is a closed universe consisting
only of the statute at issue and dictionary definitions of its
individual terms.196 Like new textualism, muscular textualism
permits the interpreter to consider the general structure of the
broader statutory scheme and the statutory history.197 Further,
if the statutory language remains ambiguous after examination
of the immediate textual context, the permissible context
becomes somewhat broader.198
C.

More Context Can Be Considered for Ambiguous Language

If a muscular textualist concludes that the language is
reasonably susceptible to multiple meanings after exhausting
the text and context discussed above, she may somewhat
broaden her search for meaning. She can do so by giving greater
weight to language in other provisions, language in other parts
of the same statute, and even some extratextual
considerations.199
more natural to me to describe the final judgment as compensation for his
injury than for services (never) rendered.”).
192. See supra Part II.B.2.
193. See supra Part II.B.12.
194. See supra Part II.B.12.
195. See supra Part II.A.
196. See supra Part II.B.34.
197. See supra Part II.B.3.4.
198. See infra Part II.C.
199. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct.
1009, 1015 (2020) (discussing causation requirements in other sections where
“the statute’s text does not expressly discuss causation”); Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 162425 (2018) (applying the harmonious-reading
canon and looking to the broader structure of the NLRA upon finding that one
interpretation of the NLRA conflicts with the FAA while another is
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Where the language itself is ambiguous after the muscular
textualist has consulted contemporaneous dictionaries,
statutory structure, and statutory history, she may give
significant weight to specific language in the same or related
statutes.200 In Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African
American-Owned Media,201 the parties disagreed over the
causation standard in a § 1981202 claim.203 Justice Gorsuch,
writing for the majority, first found that “the statute’s text [did]
not expressly discuss causation,” though it was “suggestive.”204
He then turned to other sections of the Civil Rights Act of
1866205 for guidance.206 In concluding that § 1981 required
traditional but-for causation, Justice Gorsuch relied on the fact
that “a neighboring section” required that same causation
standard.207 Because he had first concluded that the statutory
language was ambiguous, his analysis placed more weight on
the specific language in a related section than it otherwise would
have.208

reconcilable with it); Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 610 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (looking to use of the same term later in the sentence).
200. See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 232839 (2019) (relying
heavily on the statute’s prefatory language and related statutes after
concluding that “‘in ordinary speech,’ this word can carry at least two possible
meanings”); HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refin., LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n.,
141 S. Ct. 2172, 2176–77 (2021) (relying on the temporal limitation in other
subsections where the “key word” was “nowhere defined in the statute
and . . . can mean different things depending on context”).
201. 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
203. See Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1013 (explaining the plaintiff’s
contention that § 1981 departs from the traditional “but for” causation
requirement).
204. Id. at 1015.
205. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1870).
206. See Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1016 (“In light of the causation
standard Congress specified for the cause of action it expressly endorsed, it
would be more than a little incongruous for us to employ the laxer rules [the
plaintiff] proposes for this Court’s judicially implied cause of action.”).
207. See id. at 1015 (“To prove a violation . . . [under § 1982] the
government had to show that the defendant’s challenged actions were taken
‘on account of’ or ‘by reason of’ raceterms we have often held indicate a
but-for causation requirement.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
208. See supra Part II.B.2.
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Ambiguous language may also permit a muscular textualist
to rely on extratextual considerations to some extent.209 In Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis,210 the Court had to determine whether
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)211 permitted
employees to contract away their right to collective
arbitration.212 If so, the NLRA conflicted with the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).213 The majority found that the NLRA
“sa[id] nothing about how judges and arbitrators must try legal
disputes that leave the workplace and enter the courtroom or
arbitral forum.”214 In light of this ambiguity, the majority turned
to the harmonious-reading canon, which provides that “the
provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders
them
compatible,
not
contradictory.”215
Per
the
harmonious-reading canon, the majority’s muscular textualist
analysis adopted the interpretation of the NLRA that does not
conflict with the FAA.216 In so doing, it gave more weight to the
extratextual considerations inherent in the harmonious-reading
canon than it would have if it had not first determined that the
language was ambiguous.217
209. Common law analogues are also a common source of extratextual
consideration if the statute is ambiguous. See, e.g., Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe,
141 S. Ct. 1931, 194142 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (looking to common
law tort suits where nothing in the Alien Tort Statute indicated whether the
defendant could be a corporation). A complete analysis of the use of common
law analogues requires consideration of how common law analogues are used
in constitutional interpretation and is therefore beyond the scope of this Note.
210. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
211. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151166.
212. See Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619 (stating the issue before the
Court).
213. 9 U.S.C. §§ 114; see Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 162021
(explaining the potential conflict between the two Acts).
214. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619.
215. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 21, at 180; see Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S.
Ct. at 1624 (“When confronted with two Acts of Congress allegedly touching
on the same topic, this Court is not at ‘liberty to pick and choose among
congressional enactments’ and must instead strive ‘to give effect to both.’”
(quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974))).
216. See Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1632 (concluding that the two
statutes do not conflict).
217. See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2332 (2019)
[W]hen presented with two “fair alternatives,” this Court has
sometimes adopted the narrower construction of a criminal statute
to avoid having to hold it unconstitutional if it were construed more
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As the cases discussed above show, muscular textualism
does not follow the same interpretive steps as new textualism.218
In some instances, muscular textualism will lead the interpreter
to adopt a different interpretation than she would if she were
applying a new textualist analysis.219 In Bostock, the result was
a victory for individual rights advocates.220 But this will not
always be the case.221 To better understand muscular
textualism’s potential consequences, it is helpful to apply the
analysis to several specific individual rights disputes.
III. APPLYING MUSCULAR TEXTUALISM
This Part applies muscular textualism to two interpretive
issues that have created a circuit split. As outlined above, a
muscular textualist begins with the contemporaneous
dictionary definitions of the terms in the statute.222 Next, she
confirms the meaning derived from the definitions of the terms
against the statute’s general structure and statutory history.223
In so doing, she does not give social context and societal
understandings of the language at the time of enactment any
weight.224 If she cannot give the statute a clear meaning based
on this context, the muscular textualist may then give weight to
other statutory language and even some extratextual
considerations.225

broadly. But no one before us as identified a case in which this
Court has invoked the canon to expand the reach of a criminal
statute in order to save it. (internal citations omitted).
218. See cases discussed supra Part II.AC and accompanying text.
219. See Grove, supra note 8, at 26567 (explaining that there are differing
strands of textualism).
220. See, e.g., Totenberg, supra note 3 (“The [Bostock] decision is a huge
victory for the LGBTQ community . . . .”).
221. See, e.g., Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 57980 (10th Cir. 2011)
(finding that the defendant had no right to appeal his sentence even though
the United States Supreme Court had reinterpreted the statute under which
the defendant had been convicted such that he might not have been convicted
at all if tried under the new interpretation).
222. See supra notes 7689 and accompanying text.
223. See supra Part II.B.34.
224. See supra Part II.B.1.
225. See supra Part II.C.
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First, this Part examines whether Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act226 prohibits restrictive voter ID laws by methodically
applying the muscular textualist analysis.227 It then turns to
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act,228 asking
whether plasma centers are subject to compliance with
Title III.229 Rather than working through the framework, as in
Part III.A, this analysis points out specific interpretive moves
the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit courts made and explains
how a muscular textualist’s analysis would differ.230
A.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Does Not Prohibit
Restrictive Voter ID Laws

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits every
“qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure . . . which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right . . . to vote on account of race.”231 It further specifies that
the vote is denied or abridged “only where ‘the political processes
leading to nomination or election’ are not ‘equally open to
participation’ by members of the relevant protected group ‘in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.’”232 Several circuits have
considered challenges to restrictive voter ID laws on grounds
that they violate Section 2.233 The Fifth Circuit struck down
Texas’s voter ID law because it “acted in concert with current

226. 52 U.S.C. §§ 1030110314.
227. See infra Part III.A.
228. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1218112189.
229. See infra Part III.B.
230. See infra Part III.AB.
231. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
232. Brnovich v. Dem. Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2337 (2021) (quoting
52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)).
233. See generally Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2012)
(considering a challenge to Arizona’s voter ID law); Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d
744 (7th Cir. 2014) (considering a challenge to Wisconsin’s voter ID law);
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (considering a challenge to
Texas’ voter ID law); Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir.
2016) (considering a challenge to Virginia’s voter ID law); Greater
Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State., 966 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2020)
(considering a challenge to Alabama’s voter ID law).
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and historical conditions of discrimination” to violate
Section 2.234 The Seventh Circuit upheld Wisconsin’s voter ID
law and further opined that voter ID laws cannot violate
Section 2 because the resulting racial disparity in voter
qualification is not “on account of race” but on account of other
current socioeconomic disparities that are the result of past
discrimination.235 The Fourth and Ninth Circuits did not reach
this issue because they upheld the voter ID laws on narrow,
fact-specific grounds.236 The Eleventh Circuit upheld Alabama’s
law and echoed the Seventh Circuit’s doubt as to whether the
Voting Rights Act applies to such suits at all.237 The circuits
agree that plaintiffs must satisfy two elements to succeed on a
Section 2 claim: (1) “the challenged law has to ‘result in’ the
denial or abridgement of the right to vote”;238 and (2) “the denial
or abridgement of the right to vote must be ‘on account of
race.’”239 But there is disagreement as to what these two
elements entail.
Until 2021, the Supreme Court had only applied Section 2
to “vote dilution” claims.240 On the last day of the October 2020
term, it handed down the opinion in Brnovich v. Democratic
National Committee,241 reinterpreting Section 2 for rules that

234. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 264 (5th Cir. 2016) (striking down
Texas’s voter ID law on grounds that it “ha[d] a discriminatory effect on
minorities’ voting rights in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act”).
235. See Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[U]nits of
government are responsible for their own discrimination but not for rectifying
the effects of other person’s discrimination.”).
236. See Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592, 601 (4th Cir. 2016)
(“[W]here, as here, Virginia allows everyone to vote and provides free photo
IDs to persons without them, we conclude that SB 1256 . . . does not violate § 2
of the Voting Rights Act.”); Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 442 (9th Cir.
2012) (Berzon, J., concurring) (“[T]he court holds only that the current record
is insufficient to show [a violation of Section 2] . . . . A different record in a
future case could produce a different outcome . . . .”).
237. See Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State., 966 F.3d 1202,
1234 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing the Seventh Circuit’s opinion with approval).
238. Id. at 1233.
239. Id.; see id. at 123334 (stating the tests applied by the various
circuits).
240. See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2336 (explaining that the case represents
the Court’s “first foray into the area of” vote denial claims).
241. 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021).
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“specify the time, place, or manner for casting ballots.”242 This
opinion, written by Justice Samuel Alito, was decided after the
circuit cases above applied Section 2 to voter ID requirements.
It provides new guidance, but it does not fully resolve the
disagreement between the circuits for two reasons. First, the
majority in Brnovich noted, “[B]ecause this is our first § 2 time,
place, or manner case, a fresh look at the statutory text is
appropriate.”243 But voter ID requirements are a prerequisite to
voting, not regulation of the “time, place, or manner” in which
voters must cast their ballots. Thus, a future “prerequisite” case
should likewise require “a fresh look at the statutory text.”244
The court also only identified “certain guideposts” for its
decision rather than “announc[ing] a test to govern all” Section 2
claims.245 Therefore, lower courts must continue to look to the
statute itself for guidance, not just Supreme Court precedent.
Second, the Court upheld the Arizona voting law at issue in
Brnovich on the first prong of the Section 2 inquiry: whether the
law denied or abridged the right of minority voters to cast their
ballots.246 Because it held that the law did not “result in” racially
disparate vote denial or abridgement, it did not reach the
secondary question of whether denial or abridgement occurred
“on account of race,” nor did it address the proper considerations
for that inquiry.247
1.

Denial or Abridgement of the Right to Vote

The Circuits applied different standards to determine
whether the Section 2 plaintiffs’ right to vote had been denied
or abridged. In striking down the Texas law, the Fifth Circuit
relied on the trial court’s finding that a disparate number of
minority voters lack the proper ID.248 It then determined that

242. Id. at 2336.
243. Id. at 2337.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2336.
246. See id. at 2348 (concluding that “the modest evidence of racially
disparate burdens caused by [the law], in light of the State’s justifications,
leads us to the conclusion that the law does not violate § 2 of the VRA”).
247. Cf. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
248. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 250 (5th Cir. 2016) (stating the
evidence in support of the district court’s findings).
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this was sufficient evidence of abridgement of the right to
vote.249 Conversely, the Seventh Circuit determined that this
“disparate outcome” did not “show a ‘denial’ of anything by
Wisconsin . . . unless Wisconsin makes it needlessly hard to get
photo ID.”250 The first interpretive question then is: what
constitutes “denial or abridgement” of the right to vote?
In Brnovich the Court announced that Section 2(b)
“explains what must be shown to establish” denial or
abridgement:251
[T]he core of § 2(b) is the requirement that voting be
“equally open.” The statute’s reference to equal
“opportunity” [to participate in the political process]
may stretch the concept to some degree to include
consideration of a person’s ability to use the means that
are open. But equal openness remains the
touchstone.252
It further noted that “[t]he provision requires consideration
of the totality of [the] circumstances,” and went on to compile a
non-exhaustive list of factors that lower courts might
consider.253 Because these factors are not grounded in the text,
249. See id. at 260 (stating that “the district court’s finding that” the law
causes “a racial disparity in voter ID possession falls comfortably within” the
definition of abridgement).
250. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014). The Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits made the same point. See Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,
843 F.3d 592, 601 (4th Cir. 2016) (“If Virginia had required voters to present
identifications without accommodating citizens who lacked them, the rule
might arguably deprive some voters of an equal opportunity to vote.”); Greater
Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State, 966 F.3d 1202, 1233 (11th Cir. 2020)
(“Even though minority voters in Alabama are slightly more likely than white
voters not to have compliant IDs, the plain language of Section 2 requires
more.”).
251. Brnovich v. Dem. Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2337 (2021).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 2338–40. The factors the Brnovich majority lists are entirely
extrastatutory. See id. at 2362 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the
majority’s test as “a list of mostly made-up factors, at odds with Section 2
itself” and “a set of extra-textual restrictions on Section 2methods of
counteracting the law Congress actually drafted to achieve the purposes
Congress though ‘important’”). Nowhere in the text of Section 2 is there any
indication that “the degree to which a voting rule departs from what was
standard practice when § 2 was amended in 1982” or “the strength of the state
interests served by a challenged voting rule” can or should inform the inquiry.
Id. at 2338–39, 2339–40 (majority opinion). The Court’s reliance on the extent
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a muscular textualist would likely reject their application.254
Instead she would accept the Brnovich Court’s directive that the
central consideration must be whether the political process is
“equally open,” and would additionally look to the literal
meaning of “denial” and “abridgement.”255 “Denial” means “[a]
deprivation,”256 or “a refusal to comply or satisfy.”257 Based on
the test announced in Brnovich, this requires the plaintiff to
show that the political process is not “equally open” in that some
voters did not have the same opportunity to obtain a photo ID.258
A law can also violate Section 2 if it “results in . . . abridgement
of the right . . . to vote.”259 “Abridgement” means “condensation,
to which the rule departs from standard practice in 1982 is particularly
perplexing, because if Congress had not perceived problematic voting rules in
1982 it is doubtful that it would have thought it necessary to amend Section 2.
See infra Part III.A.4; Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2354 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(stating that the majority acted “as though the Voting Rights Act no longer
has a problem to addressas though once literacy tests and poll taxes
disappeared, so too did efforts to curb minority voting”); id. at 2363–64
(“Section 2 was meant to disrupt the status quo, not to preserve itto
eradicate then-current discriminatory practices, not to set them in amber.”).
The dissent rests on Section 2’s command that “the totality of circumstances”
has “bearing on whether a State makes voting ‘equally open’ to all,” and thus
grudgingly accepts the Gingles factors, which are derived from the 1986 vote
denial case Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at
2335–36, 2341 (majority opinion). It nonetheless contemptuously decried the
dissent’s discussion of several factors that, according to Justice Alito, “have
little bearing on the question” before the Court, such as the Supreme Court’s
2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), “voting rules
that are not at issue,” and “points of law that nobody disputes,” but the
majority nonetheless refused to recognize. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2341.
254. For this reason, it is surprising that Justice Gorsuch joined the
opinion in full and did not even mention the lack of a textual basis for the
majority’s test in his short, one-paragraph concurrence. See Brnovich, 141 S.
Ct. at 2350 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
255. See supra Part II.A.
256. Denial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
257. Denial, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1969); see Denial, BRITANNICA WORLD LANGUAGE DICTIONARY
(1960) (defining “denial” as a “rejection” and “[r]efusal to grant, indulge, or
agree”); Denial, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1966)
(defining “denial” as “the refusal of or the refusal to satisfy a claim, request,
desire, etc.,” and “refusal to recognize or acknowledge”).
258. See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2341 (majority opinion) (stating that
courts must consider “whether a state makes voting ‘equally open’ to all and
gives everyone an equal ‘opportunity’ to vote”).
259. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
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contraction”260 or “curtailment.”261 As the Brnovich Court
conceded, “[A]n ‘abridgement’ of the right to vote under § 2 does
not require outright denial of the right.”262 But, citing Crawford
v. Marion County Election Board,263 it averred that “every voting
rule imposes a burden of some sort” and that “[m]ere
inconvenience cannot be enough to demonstrate a violation of
§ 2.”264 In Crawford, the Supreme Court noted that “the
inconvenience of making a trip to the [DMV], gathering the
required documents, and posing for a photograph surely does
not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote, or even
represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of
voting.”265 Though Crawford is not controlling because it
involved a constitutional, rather than a statutory, challenge to
the voter ID law, the Court’s prior determination as to the
substantiality of the burden on the voter and the state’s
interests is “elevated . . . to a status of legislative fact” and
deserves deference.266
Based on this context, the literal meaning of the statutory
language is not ambiguous. The first element of a Section 2
claim requires, at minimum, a showing that the law imposes a
discriminatory burden on the ability to vote. At least for the
small class of voters who cannot obtain proper identification,
voter ID laws result in abridgement of the right to vote. Under
Brnovich, the plaintiff also retains the burden of proving that
the voting restriction imposes a meaningful burden; that the
260. Abridgement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
261. See Abridgement, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (1969) (defining
“abridgement” as “the state of being abridged” and “abridge” as “to curtail, cut
short”); Abridgement, BRITANNICA WORLD LANGUAGE DICTIONARY (1960)
(defining “abridgement” as “the state of being abridged” and “abridge” as “to
curtail or lessen, as rights”); Abridgement, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (1966)
(defining “abridgement” as “the state of being abridged” and “abridge” as “to
reduce or lessen in duration, scope, etc.; diminish; curtail”).
262. Brnovich v. Dem. Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2341 (2021); see id. at
2357 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[A]bridgement necessarily means something
more subtle and less drastic than the complete denial of the right to cast a
ballot, denial being separately forbidden.” (alteration in original) (internal
quotation omitted)).
263. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
264. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2338 (majority opinion).
265. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198.
266. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 314 (5th Cir. 2016) (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
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rule “departs from what was standard practice when § 2 was
amended in 1982”; that the racial disparity is sufficiently large;
whether voters had alternative means to vote; and “the strength
of the state interests served by a challenged voting rule.”267
Even that is not the end of the matter: “a § 2 challenge
based purely on a showing of some relevant statistical disparity
between minorities and whites, without any evidence that the
challenged voting qualification causes that disparity, will be
rejected.”268 Section 2 also requires evidence of a causal
connection between the voting qualification’s denial of the right
to vote and the prospective voter’s race.269 The Brnovich Court
did not find a meaningful disparity, and thus did not reach this
prong of the inquiry. But in the ever-smaller number of cases in
which plaintiffs can make the showing of “denial or
abridgement” required by Brnovich, a muscular textualist will
also require a showing of causation.
2.

The Causation Standard

In the absence of a clear directive from the Supreme Court,
there is much confusion about Section 2’s causation standard.
The Fifth Circuit majority applied a multi-factor test derived
from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Thornburg v. Gingles270 to
provide “the requisite causal link between the burden on voting
rights and the fact that this burden affects minorities
disparately because it interacts with social and historical
conditions that have produced discrimination against minorities
currently, in the past, or both.”271 Under this approach, the court
must look to the “Gingles factors” after it finds a disparate
impact.272 If the Gingles factors indicate a historic burden on
267. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2338–40.
268. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 405 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation omitted).
269. See infra Part III.A.2.
270. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
271. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 245 (majority opinion).
272. See id.
These factors include:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the
democratic process;
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minorities and a threat of disenfranchisement, then the election
regulation must be struck down.273 The problem with this
analysis is that, practically speaking, the state’s history of
discrimination is often determinative. Since historical racial
discrimination is ubiquitous in the United States, once the
plaintiff has shown a disparate impact, “the causal analysis
becomes a mere formality” under this approach.274 The Fifth
Circuit’s dissent and the Eleventh Circuit majority forcefully
rejected application of the “extra-statutory Gingles factors.”275
Because the plain language of the statute sets out the applicable
causation standard, muscular textualism also requires
repudiation of the Gingles factors.
Section 2 prohibits laws that result in denial or
abridgement of the right to vote “on account of race.”276 “On

2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements,
anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures
that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the
minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of
the minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state
or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such
areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their
ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or
subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
273. Id.
274. Megan Larrondo & Robert Barry, The Voting Rights Act Isn’t a
Moving Target, But the 9th Circuit’s Test Would Turn It Into One,
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 23, 2021, 10:47 AM), https://perma.cc/2SSM-MAM9.
275. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 306 (Jones, J., dissenting); see id. at 304 (“The
majority’s errors lead it to depart from the statute’s text, resulting in the
adoption of non-textual and irrelevant ‘factors’ that, in practice, amount to
little more than a naked disparate impact test.”); Greater Birmingham
Ministries v. Sec’y of State, 966 F.3d 1202, 1235 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e
question the applicability of Gingles to this case. Gingles was a vote dilution
case and this case involves vote denial, a fundamentally different
claim . . . . How, then, can we apply the factors to this case? The obvious
answer is that we cannot.”).
276. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
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account of” means “by reason of” or “because of.”277 This
language “incorporates the ‘simple’ and ‘traditional’ standard of
but-for causation.”278 Accordingly, to succeed on a Section 2
claim, plaintiffs must show that, “but for” their race, their vote
would not have been denied or abridged.279
3.

The Meaning of “Race”

If a muscular textualist is to determine whether denial or
abridgement occurred “on account of race,” he must first define
the operative term “race.” The Fifth Circuit struck down Texas’s
voter ID law because it interacted with “social and historical
conditions of discrimination such that the abridgement
[occurred] ‘on account of race.’”280 A muscular textualist would
not agree that this constitutes a violation of Section 2 because
the abridgement did not occur “on account of race.”281 If “a black
voter and a white voter of equal means who each lack ID and a
birth certificate, and who each live an equal distance away from
the registrar’s office” bear the same burden and must follow the
same procedure to get the proper ID, the requirement does not

277. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020) (“[A]s this
Court has previously explained, ‘the ordinary meaning of “because of” is “by
reason of” or “on account of.”’” (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
570 U.S. 338, 350 (2013))).
278. Id. (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Univ. of Tex.
Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346 (2013)); see Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1015 (2020) (“To prove a
violation, then, the government had to show that the defendant’s challenged
actions were taken ‘“on account of”’ or ‘“by reason of”’ raceterms we have
often held indicate a but-for causation requirement.” (quoting Gross v. FBL
Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 17677 (2009) (Thomas, J.))). Notably, Justice
Gorsuch does not turn to the dictionary to interpret causation standards. As
he explains in Comcast, this is because the “ancient and simple ‘but for’
common law causation test . . . supplies the ‘default’ or ‘background’ rule
against which Congress is normally presumed to have legislated when
creating its own new causes of action.” See Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1014.
279. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (“[But-for] causation is established
whenever a particular outcome would not have happened “but for” the
purported cause. In other words, a but-for test directs us to change one thing
at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for
cause.”).
280. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 253 (5th Cir. 2016).
281. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
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abridge voting on account of race.282 “Race” means “[a] local
geographic or global human population distinguished as a more
or less distinct group by genetically transmitted physical
characteristics,” or “any group of people united or classified
together on the basis of common history, nationality, or
geographical distribution.”283 Under a muscular textualist
analysis, “social and historical conditions of discrimination” do
not fall within the literal definition of “race.”284
The Seventh Circuit recognized this and stated that
Section 2 “forbids discrimination by ‘race or color’ but does not
require states to overcome societal effects of private
discrimination that affect the income or wealth of potential
voters.”285 The Fifth Circuit sought to distinguish its case by

282. Greater Birmingham Ministries, 966 F.3d at 1232 (internal quotation
omitted). Compare Brnovich v. Dem. Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2339 (2021)
To the extent that minority and non-minority groups differ with
respect to employment, wealth, and education, even neutral
regulations, no matter how crafted, may well result in some
predictable disparities in rates of voting and noncompliance with
voting rules. But the mere fact there is some disparity in impact
does not necessarily mean that a system is not equally open or that
it does not give everyone an equal opportunity to vote.
with id. at 2363 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The drafters of the Voting Rights Act
understood that ‘social and historical conditions’ including disparities in
education, wealth, and employment, often affect opportunities to vote.”).
283. Race, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1969); see Race, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951) (defining
“race” as “a great division of mankind having in common certain
distinguishing physical peculiarities constituting a comprehensive class
appearing to be derived from a distinct primitive source”); Race, RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1966) (defining “race” as “a
group of persons related by common descent, blood, or heredity” and “a
population so related”); Race, BRITANNICA WORLD LANGUAGE DICTIONARY
(1960) (defining “race” as “[a]ny class of beings having characteristics uniting
them, or differentiating them from others”).
284. See Veasey, 830 F.3d at 261 (“[T]he impact of past and current
discrimination on minorities in Texas favors finding that SB 14 has a
discriminatory effect under Section 2.”).
285. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014); see Brnovich, 141
S. Ct. at 2339 (majority opinion)
To the extent that minority and non-minority groups differ with
respect to employment, wealth, and education, even neutral
regulations, no matter how crafted, may well result in some
predictable disparities in rates of voting and noncompliance with
voting rules. But the mere fact that there is some disparity in

1148

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1105 (2021)

pointing to “the lasting effects of [Texas’s] State-sponsored
discrimination.”286 But Wisconsin, like Texas, has a long history
of “State-sponsored discrimination.”287 As the Seventh Circuit
noted, the but-for cause of the disparity in voter eligibility is the
disparity “in economic circumstances” between white and
minority voters, not their race.288
Though new textualists might permit a somewhat broader
view of what it means to deny or abridge the right to vote on
account of race, muscular textualism does not.289 In Bostock, the
dissent criticized the majority for its expansive view of the
meaning of “sex” in Title VII.290 But the majority’s definition of
“sex” was not broader or more “progressive” than that of the
dissent. Contrary to the dissent’s accusation, the majority did
not hold that “sexual orientation” falls within the definition of
“sex.”291 Rather, it merely held that on the facts presented, the
defendants had discriminated on account of sex.292 In the
context of Section 2, a muscular textualist would not conclude
that past racial discrimination is the same thing as race.

impact does not necessarily mean that a system is not equally open
or that it does not give everyone an equal opportunity to vote.
286. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 248.
287. Id.; cf. Marc V. Levine, The State of Black Milwaukee in National
Perspective: Racial Inequality in the Nation’s 50 Largest Metropolitan Areas.
In 65 Charts and Tables, CTR. FOR ECON. DEV. 1018 (2020),
https://perma.cc/8KHJ-FK3F (PDF) (examining residential segregation in
Milwaukee).
288. See Walker, 768 F.3d at 753 (discussing the relationship between race,
poverty, and possession of the proper voter ID).
289. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 408 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating “[i]f, for example, a county permitted voter registration for only three
hours one day a week, and that made it more difficult for blacks to register
than whites” Section 2 would “be violated”).
290. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1755 (2020) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court tries to convince readers that it is merely enforcing the
terms of the statute, but that is preposterous. Even as understood today, the
concept of discrimination because of ‘sex’ is different from discrimination
because of ‘sexual orientation’ or ‘gender identity.’”).
291. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 68, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020)
(No. 17-1618) (“No one has claimed that sexual orientation is the same thing
as sex.”).
292. See id.
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Statutory History

Section 2’s statutory history does not alter the muscular
textualist construction of the statute. In Mobile v. Bolden,293 the
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had to prove discriminatory
intent to succeed on a Section 2 claim.294 Less than a year after
Bolden was handed down, Congress introduced, and later
passed, a bill to amend the statute to clarify that the burden of
proof in a Section 2 claim is lower than in a corresponding
constitutional claim.295 The purpose of the amendment was “to
repudiate Bolden and establish a new vote-dilution test.”296
Perhaps this history counsels toward a somewhat more
permissive view of what evidence is sufficient to show “denial or
abridgement of the right to vote.”297 But for a muscular
textualist, the statutory history cannot outweigh the fact that
vote abridgement must occur “on account of race.”298
Based on a muscular textualist interpretation of Section 2,
a plaintiff seeking to challenge a voter ID law must prove that
the right of minority voters to vote has been disparately denied
or abridged.299 He must also prove that but for their race,
293. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
294. See id. at 6062 (“[T]he sparse legislative history of § 2 makes clear
that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth
Amendment itself . . . . The Court’s more recent decisions confirm the principle
that racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth
Amendment violation.”).
295. Brnovich v. Dem. Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2021); see id. at
2351 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (stating that the amendment “became necessary
when [the] Court construed the statute too narrowly”); Daniel P. Tokaji, The
New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C.
L. REV. 689, 70405 (2006) (discussing Section 2’s statutory history).
296. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2332 (majority opinion).
297. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 243 (2016) (“Unlike
discrimination claims brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress has clarified that violations of Section 2(a) can ‘be proved by showing
discriminatory effect alone.’” (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35
(1986))).
298. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (emphasis added).
299. A plaintiff seeking to vindicate his right to vote by filing suit under
Section 2 may face another hurdle. In a short, one-paragraph concurrence in
Brnovich, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, stated that Section 2
may not even “furnish an implied cause of action,” but nonetheless joined the
Court’s opinion in full because “no party argues that the plaintiffs lack a cause
of action here.” Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2350 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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leaving all socio-economic circumstances the same and ignoring
the lasting effects of centuries of discrimination, the denial or
abridgement would not have occurred.300 This is a steep
undertaking.
In
light
of
continuing,
persistent
disenfranchisement of minority voters,301 this restrictive
reading of our “Nation’s signal piece of civil-rights legislation”302
undermines the Act’s promise “to secure to all our polity equal
citizenship stature, a voice in our democracy undiluted by
race.”303 Though muscular textualism gives an extremely
restrictive meaning to Section 2, it will not do so for every
statute, as the analysis of the Americans with Disabilities Act
below demonstrates.304 The fact that muscular textualism gives
a narrow rights-restrictive meaning to some statutes, while
giving a broader rights-protective meaning to others, rebuts the
allegation that muscular textualism is results-oriented.305
B.

Title III of the ADA Applies to Plasma Centers

Unlike the muscular textualist analysis of Section 2
outlined above, muscular textualism would likely not give a
narrow,
rights-restrictive
construction
to
the
term
“service-establishment” in Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Title III prohibits discrimination “on the basis
of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services,
facilities,
privileges,
advantages,
or
accommodations . . . by any person who owns, leases (or leases

300. See supra notes 231288 and accompanying text.
301. See Christian Hosam, The Supreme Court’s Long War Against Voting
Rights, WASH. POST (June 15, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/8GB3-2ZR3
(“White lawmakers will write laws and create administrative practices that,
on their face, are racially neutral but that have the effect of excluding minority
voters from exercising their constitutional rights.”).
302. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 580 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
303. Id. at 592.
304. See infra Part III.B.
305. Cf. Letter from the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human
Rights to Chuck Grassley, Chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 20,
2017), https://perma.cc/PE6P-W9TR (PDF) (“[Justice] Gorsuch has
demonstrated in his opinions and writings that he is results-oriented and
would be highly unlikely to show independence from a President who shares
his ideological agenda.”).
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to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”306 The statute
defines “public accommodations,” in relevant part, to include “a
laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel
service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of
an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office,
professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other
service establishment.”307
In Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc.,308 the Tenth
Circuit had to determine whether plasma centers are subject to
Title III.309 A plasma center is a facility where donors can donate
blood plasma.310 Before donating, donors must undergo a health
screening process.311 The plasma center pays donors for their
plasma and subsequently sells the plasma to pharmaceutical
companies.312 Plasma centers are not among the specifically
enumerated public accommodations in § 12181(7)(F), but the
plaintiff in Levorsen alleged that the plasma center fell under
the catchall term “other service establishment.”313 The
defendant plasma center disagreed because plasma centers
“don’t provide a service to the public in exchange for a fee.”314
Relying heavily on Supreme Court precedent which required
courts to construe Title III liberally, the Tenth Circuit
determined that plasma centers are indeed “service
establishments” and thus subject to Title III.315 The Fifth Circuit

306. 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
307. Id. § 12181(7)(F) (emphasis added).
308. 828 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2016).
309. See id. at 122930.
310. See id. at 1229 (explaining that the plaintiff had tried to donate
plasma at one of Octapharma Plasma’s plasma centers).
311. See Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2019)
(stating that the plasma center “screens prospective donors for known health
risks, extracts plasma from qualifying individuals, freezes it, and then ships it
to manufacturing plants to be made into medicines”).
312. Levorsen, 828 F.3d at 1229.
313. See id. (“In his complaint, Levorsen alleged that [plasma centers] like
Octapharma are public accommodations because they are service
establishments.”).
314. Id. at 1230.
315. See id. at 1234 (“Accordingly, we conclude that [plasma centers] like
Octapharma are service establishments under § 12181(7)(F). And because
they are service establishments under § 12181(7)(F), they are public
accommodations for purposes of Title III.”).
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disagreed.316 In Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc.,317 it held that the
plasma center “does not offer plasma collection as a ‘service’ to
a customer and is therefore not a ‘service establishment.’”318 One
year later, in Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc.,319 the Third Circuit
examined the issue and sided with the Tenth Circuit.320 It, too,
held that plasma centers are “service establishments” under the
ADA.321 The circuits all agreed that plasma centers are
“establishments.”322 The dispute concerned whether plasma
centers provide a “service” within the meaning of Title III.323
The Tenth and Fifth Circuits noted that remedial statutes
like the Americans with Disabilities Act must be liberally
construed.324 New textualists reject this proposition.325 Based on
Justice Gorsuch’s reluctance to rely on canons of construction to
depart from the literal construction of a statute, muscular
textualists reject this proposition as well.326 But that alone will

316. See Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 907 F.3d 323, 329 (5th Cir. 2018)
(“We disagree with the Tenth Circuit . . . about whether plasma collection
centers provide a ‘service’ to customers.”).
317. 907 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2018).
318. Id. at 332.
319. 936 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2019).
320. See id. at 174 (“We conclude . . . that the Tenth Circuit got it right:
the ADA applies to plasma donation centers.”).
321. Id. at 178.
322. See Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227, 123134
(10th Cir. 2016) (“An establishment is a ‘place of business’ . . . . [Plasma
centers] like Octapharma are ‘place[s] of business.’” (quoting Establishment,
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002)) (second brackets in
original)); Silguero, 907 F.3d at 328 (stating that there is no dispute in the case
as to whether “CSL Plasma is an ‘establishment’”); Matheis, 936 F.3d at 177
(agreeing with the Tenth Circuit).
323. Compare Levorsen, 828 F.3d at 1234 (concluding that plasma centers
do provide a service), with Silguero, 907 F.3d at 332 (concluding that plasma
centers do not provide a service).
324. See Levorsen, 828 F.3d at 1230 (“[C]ourts must construe § 12181(7)(F)
liberally to afford individuals with disabilities access to the same
establishments available to those without disabilities.”); Silguero, 907 F.3d at
329 (“[E]ven when a statute is to be construed liberally, it is still not
untethered from its text.”).
325. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 21, at 364366 (criticizing “[t]he
false notion that remedial statutes should be liberally construed”).
326. See supra note 115 and accompanying text; BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 153839 (2021)
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not resolve the circuit split as to whether plasma centers are
subject to Title III.
The dissenting opinion in the Tenth Circuit relied on two
canons of construction to determine the “plain meaning of the
statutory terms:”327 ejusdem generis, which provides that “when
a general term follows a specific one, the general term should be
understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with
specific enumeration,” and noscitur a sociis, which provides that
a term is “given more precise content by the neighboring words
with which it is associated.”328 It asserted that “such canons of
statutory construction are aids in construing the language
itselfnot tools to be relied on only in the face of ambiguity.”329
A muscular textualist would disagree.330 But this, too, will not
resolve the circuit split, because a muscular textualist must first
seek to determine the statute’s plain meaning by looking to the
definitions of its terms.331
The dissent in the Tenth Circuit also cautioned against “the
analytical misstep of concluding that the unambiguous meaning
of a statutory term may be divined perforce from the meaning of
its component terms.”332 Muscular textualism embraces this
approach.333 Therefore, a “service establishment,” as that term
is used in § 12181(7)(F) “isunsurprisinglyan establishment
that provides a service.”334 An “establishment” is defined as a
“place of business or residence together with all the things that

This court has no license to give statutory exemptions anything but
a fair reading. Exceptions and exemptions are no less part of
Congress’s work than its rules and standardsand all are worthy
of a court’s respect. . . . Whatever the reason for a legislative
compromise, we have no right to place our thumbs on one side of
the scale or the other. (internal quotations omitted).
327. Levorsen, 838 F.3d at 1236 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 1237 (internal quotations omitted).
329. Id.
330. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
331. See supra Part II.A.
332. Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227, 1241 (10th Cir.
2016) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
333. See New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 53940 (2019)
(interpreting the statutory term “contract of employment” with reference to
the meaning of “contract” and “employment”).
334. Levorsen, 828 F.3d at 1231 (majority opinion).
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are an essential part of it.”335 Plasma centers are
“establishments.”336 The question is whether they provide a
“service.”
“Service” is “an act of helping or benefiting,” “friendly or
professional assistance,” or the act of supplying “(a person) with
something.”337 Contrary to the position of the Tenth Circuit
dissent, payment to the service provider (the plasma center) is
not required.338 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that plasma centers
are not service establishments because they “do not provide any
detectable benefit for donors.”339 The Third Circuit rejected this
conclusion, and the Tenth Circuit also concluded that plasma
donors receive a benefit from the plasma center.340 The Third
and Tenth Circuits’ conclusion is reasonable and would likely
prevail. Further, at least one of the definitions of “service”
indicates that a service establishment may not have to provide
a clear benefit.341 Either way, a muscular textualist
interpretation of § 12181(7)(F) would likely conclude that
plasma centers are subject to Title III.
The construction of “service establishment” in this context
has consequences that reach beyond plasma centers. At least
one court has already relied on the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in

335. Establishment, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(1993); see Establishment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (defining
“establishment” as “[a]n institution or place of business with its fixtures and
organized staff”).
336. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
337. Service, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989); see Service,
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993) (defining “service” as
“an act done for the benefit or at the command of another”).
338. See Levorsen, 828 F.3d at 1240 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[S]ervice
establishments offer services to the public in exchange for a fee.”).
339. Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 907 F.3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 2018).
340. See Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 2019)
(finding the requirement that the donor receive a benefit satisfied); Levorsen,
828 F.3d at 1234 (majority opinion) (concluding that plasma centers help
“those who wish to provide plasma for medical usewhether for altruistic
reasons or for pecuniary gainby supplying the trained personnel and medical
equipment necessary to accomplish that goal”).
341. See Service, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (defining
“service” as the act of supplying “(a person) with something”).
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Levorsen in a different context.342 A narrow construction of Title
III would severely undermine its “broad remedial purpose”343 “to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.”344 In this instance, muscular textualism’s
literalness does not undermine the statute’s remedial power.
Justice Gorsuch’s writing makes clear that he is cognizant
of the judge’s proper role, and that he endeavors to be respectful
of Congress when interpreting statutes.345 But when the
statute’s broad remedial purpose is abundantly clear, as in the
case of individual rights statutes enacted to combat pervasive
discrimination, the restrictive construction that often results
from muscular textualist statutory interpretation stands in
contrast to his purported legislative deference.
CONCLUSION
The interpretive analysis exemplified in Justice Gorsuch’s
statutory interpretation opinions demonstrates a progression
toward an increasingly literal methodology that rejects much of
the context that new textualists routinely consider.346 Justice
Gorsuch’s appointment to the Supreme Court provides the
forum from which he can advocate for muscular textualism. It is
probable that his theories, like Justice Scalia’s, will gain
traction. In some cases, this interpretation will broaden a
statute’s reach, as it did in Bostock, allowing the statute to
provide relief to a greater number of plaintiffs.347 In others,
342. See J.H. v. Just for Kids, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 1210, 1221 (D. Utah
2017) (relying on Levorsen to determine whether Habilitation Independence
Vocational Education Socialization programs are subject to Title III).
343. Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir.
2016) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
344. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
345. See, e.g., GORSUCH, supra note 50, at 910 (describing the important
role that separation of powers among the branches of the federal government
plays); Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020) (same); Va.
Uranium Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1900 (2019) (explaining the
requirement of legislative deference in statutory interpretation); Pereida v.
Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 767 (2021) (stating that Congress’s “policy choice,
embodied in the terms of the law Congress adopted, commands this Court’s
respect”).
346. See supra Part II.
347. See supra Part III.B.

1156

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1105 (2021)

muscular textualism will severely restrict the statute’s remedial
scope.348 Scholars and judges who worry about unconstrained
judicial discretion will applaud muscular textualism’s formulaic
qualities. Others will condemn its frequently narrow
interpretations.
Justice Gorsuch’s influence will reach beyond statutory
interpretation. He has already demonstrated that he will
interpret treaties349 and the Constitution350 literally and with
little regard for decades, or even centuries, of precedent.351 How
the principles underlying muscular textualism impact these
diverse legal questions is beyond the scope of this Note. But
Justice Gorsuch’s jurisprudence suggests reconceptualization of
age-old doctrine across diverse areas of the law.352 This Note
examines his potential impact on statutory interpretation, but
scholars and judges will have to grapple with his jurisprudence
in other areas of the law as well. To ensure that our individual
rights and freedoms remain protected, we must understand how
these presumptively neutral methodologies threaten them.
Without this knowledge, our rights are in grave danger.

348. See supra Part III.A.
349. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 246870 (2020) (stating that
treaties between the federal government and Native American tribes must be
interpreted in the same way as statutes and refusing to consider “extratextual
evidence”); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, 115 NW. U.
L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2022) (manuscript at 53), https://perma.cc/9ZM9JA4P (stating that “the core focus” of Justice Gorsuch’s analysis in McGirt was
“on the legislative text”).
350. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2264 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment does not protect
reasonable expectations of privacy, and that “its plain terms” only permit its
invocation when “one of your protected things (your person, your house, your
papers, or your effects) is unreasonably searched or seized”).
351. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1999, 2009 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (advocating for the court to overrule 170 years of
precedent interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
because that precedent is “[w]ithout meaningful support in the text” and “[t]he
separate sovereigns exception was wrong when it was invented, and it remains
wrong today”).
352. See cases cited supra notes 349351; Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth
Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 103839 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the
judgment) (questioning the continued validity of Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945)).

